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by Lee Corbin Published in "The Immortalist", April 1990 The question of what constitutes an individual's identity has been shown by many writers to be far from easy to discuss, let alone resolve. I, myself, have been obsessed with this question and its ramifications for over twenty years, ever since I became a materialist. It is with much gratification that I see cryonicists exploring this issue. The issue is of practical concern to cryonicists, of course, because the tremendous effort we expend to prolong our lives could all go for nothing if our identities are lost. Whether you believe in "uploading" or not, serious and tricky questions remain about just what kinds of transformations one should allow and still hope to "be the same person". (The radical uploader must answer the question, What does it gaineth a man who liveth forever but loseth his identity?) I contend that there are in reality two main camps in this philosophic dispute. The first consists of people who hold the "similarity of state" definition of identity, (also known as the "information theory of identity"). Briefly this claims that a person is a particular pattern of information, and that in principle, any time or place in the history of the universe that this pattern recurs, the individual in question can properly be said to live at that point. The other main position (to which most people adhere, uploaders and non-uploaders alike), and which, I claim, possesses severe internal inconsistencies, is the "continuity" theory of identity. This view supposes that the history of a particular system is vital to determining what system or what person now exists. Radical uploaders, for example, maintain that they could quickly evolve into any super- advanced information processing system, even if, unfortunately, that system no longer resembled them in any way whatsoever. Dave Pizer presents a strong case for this "continuity" view in the January '90 issue of the Immortalist. Although certainly far from being an "uploader", he too insists that even profound change is acceptable provided that it is gradual. "If a ten year old boy were an average kid..., and his mind and body were somehow [suddenly] changed into that of a sixty year old..., people would say the boy was not the man and all would agree that the boy had been lost. But if this change happened slowly over a fifty year period, people would say that the boy had become the man." Mr. Pizer then goes on to say that a company that manufactures bicycles in the 1890's could gradually evolve into an entirely different company a century later (presumably retaining no important original feature), and still be "the same" company. The best way to refute this view is to deploy the "Ship of Theseus". An oared galley serves Theseus over many years and through many adventures. Gradually, however, as each plank of the ship becomes worn it is replaced until finally nothing of the original vessel remains (in terms of the specific pieces of timber). Is this still the same ship? People generally say yes, because many things with which we are familiar slowly change yet retain their identity. Then at this point one gleefully reveals to the victim that as each worn plank of the ship was removed, it was secreted away in a nearby lagoon, and piece by piece assembled into the "real" ship! Now, which do "people say" is the original ship? We should waste no time arguing about which should be called the original ship! It doesn't matter what we call things, it matters what they are! Specifically in this case, we understand the physical situation completely--- there is no mystery here. We clearly have two ships, both of which have certain similarities and certain dissimilarities to something that existed in the past. The correct and logical way to attempt to answer meaningful questions is to itemize just what similarities and dissimilarities between two things actually exist. Suppose, for example, that I am changed by an extremely slow and gradual process into a small frog--- in fact into an exact copy of some presently existing small frog. Then I am dead, period! What if I am gradually changed into an exact copy of Dave Pizer? Then I am still dead, period! The gain that there would be to the cryonics movement would be of little consolation to me because there would then be exactly two Dave Pizers and exactly zero of me! Each of the two Dave Pizers, of August 2, say, would equally well resemble the original Dave Pizer of August 1. The fact that historically one of them had derived from me and the other hadn't is information presently in neither system but held only in the external world. (It's shockingly hard to get used to, but one must in the end identify with (and even sacrifice for) all close duplicates wherever they exist throughout both space and time.) Uploaders and non-uploaders alike who imagine that somehow their "essence" would still inhabit some future creature into which they gradually evolve (but which would resemble them no more than other contemporary persons) simply have a vestigal belief in the soul. In fact, the notion that we each have a soul is so deeply woven into our culture and even our language that exorcizing it sometimes seems impossible. Were I, for example, slowly changed into a frog identical to some already existing frog, we all imagine that with the proper kiss I could be magically restored to the dashing prince that I am because the frog would somehow "still be me", even though it was specified to be "identical to some already existing frog". Those of us who correctly perceive that our identities have everything to do with our present structures, and nothing essential to do with our histories subscribe to what I call The Faith of a Physicist: All important qualities of a system depend only upon the present configuration of the system, and in principle any given characteristic can be captured by some (perhaps extremely large) description. Specifically all crucial characteristics of an extant system presently inhere in the system. No property of some system (e.g., "was once chased by Nazis", or "is secretly admired by Nancy Reagan") that does not presently reside inside the system can be part of the identity of that particular system. The "Faith of a Physicist" emboldens you, just as soon as the technology becomes available, to make like Captain Kirk and teleport yourself all over the place! (Note that the copy on the receiving end is a very, very close replica of the original.) The basic principle here suggests that if it walks like Captain Kirk, talks like Captain Kirk, and punches out people like Captain Kirk, then it IS Captain Kirk! And that if you have doubts, then you still entertain a vestigal belief in the existence of souls. The "Faith of a Physicist" also permits you to consider uploading as something you might indeed enjoy, provided that adequate similarity of structure is preserved! (For your own dear sake, don't upload if the resultant personality won't clearly, unambiguously, recognizably, and indisputably be you!) I applaud Robert Ettinger for his many path-breaking thought experiments in The Prospect of Immortality, and for his emphasis on how important feelings are. But the January statement, "...if identity over time is not just an illusion, then the minimum requirement for survival of the individual is preservation of the material and structure of the self circuit" is an unnecessary concession to the "continuity" camp. It still needs to be emphasized that our material atoms undergo replacement all the time, without affecting our identities, and that this process could theoretically be greatly accelerated without harm. Suppose you took some kind of metabolizing drug that left alone the functioning of all your body's cells, but which merely changed the rate at which the atoms were internally substituted. Essentially, there would be no effect! To deny this is to suggest that people with faster metabolisms, who turn over atoms more quickly than others, are in more danger of losing their identities. In fact, if by some miracle, every carbon atom in your body were instantaneously replaced by some other exactly similar carbon atom (and quantum mechanics allows for no possible difference), you couldn't be aware of it, and, indeed nothing of consequence actually would have transpired. It is certainly true that " A description of a thing is not the same as the thing itself, and cannot in all respects substitute for the thing." Indeed, "The Map is not the Territory". But the key question to ask is, "To what degree will a complete description of a thing allow you in principle to completely recover that thing?" The answer is almost a tautology: a complete description is, in principle, completely adequate! Conclusion: one should permit oneself to be uploaded only when many guarantees exist that one's emotions, values, beliefs, and whole personality will be transferred intact. And to ward off gradual loss of identity, one should make frequent backups of oneself and give them (i.e., receive in the persons of one's earlier selves!) substantial amounts of run time. |